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29 December 1959

The Honorable Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Hugh:

With respect to your letter of 17 December asking that the Agency prepare a paper on Khrushchev's own military and strategic thinking, I learned that there is a project going forward which is closely in line with Foy Kohler's requirements. Sherman Kent has been in touch with Allan Evans on this matter and has informed Mr. Evans that we will forward copies of the study to him as soon as it is completed. The completion date is two or three weeks hence.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Washington

Dec 17 1959

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Dear Allen:

Foy Kohler recently suggested that a study of Khrushchev's military and strategic concepts be prepared in time to be of use in the preparation of the US position for the summit conference. He mentioned no specific deadline, but I think that mid-February would probably be satisfactory to him as a completion date.

We feel that a study of this kind would be useful. As we see it, the paper might start by identifying the main themes that run through Khrushchev's remarks on military and strategic matters, and then attempt to ascertain the real nature of his concepts, taking obvious tactical purpose into account and comparing his statements with 1) Soviet military doctrine, 2) the Soviet attitude toward war and peace in the advancement of communist power, and 3) our ideas of military realities.

We are in some doubt, however, as to who would best undertake the job. A number of Khrushchev's statements, such as his remarks about the vulnerability of navies to missile attack, must, of course, be judged primarily against the background of military intelligence and technical considerations. On the other hand, an intelligence assessment of Khrushchev's remarks on military and strategic subjects involves many considerations of a non-military nature.

For obvious reasons we do not think that INR should undertake the job unilaterally. At the same time, I am afraid that the paper might become overly diffused if drafted on a community basis.

The Honorable

Allen W. Dulles

Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington

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It looks to me very much as though the paper would best be prepared by CIA. If you agree that this would be the best way to handle the matter, you will find that members of ONE are already informally aware of the problem, and I hope you will feel justified in authorizing them to undertake the project.

/s/

Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.
The Director of Intelligence and
Research

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